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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to look for evidence of financial contagion
suﬀered by several countries as a result of the latest Argentine crisis.
I focus my attention on a set of countries: Brazil, Mexico, Russia,
Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela. I also focus exclusively on three fi-
nancial markets: foreign exchange, stock exchange, and sovereign debt.
In order to test the hypothesis of contagion, Vector Autoregression
(VAR) models and instantaneous correlation coeﬃcients corrected for
heteroscedasticity are estimated. The analysis shows that there is no
evdence of contagion. This result provides empirical support for the
non-crisis-contingent theories of international financial contagion.
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1 Introduction
A number of dramatic financial crises have marked the nineties: the Ex-
change Rate Mechanism (ERM) currency attacks in 1992-93, the Tequila
crisis in 1994-95, the East Asian crises in 1997, the Russian default in 1998,
and the Brazilian devaluation in 1999. Most of these crises spread from one
country to others far away on the globe and with very diﬀerent economic
structures. This phenomenon has led many economists to study and try to
explain “contagion”, i.e. why and through what channels financial crises
spread.
There is no one generally accepted definition of contagion in the economic
literature. Diﬀerent papers adopt diﬀerent definitions as an operative basis
for theoretical or empirical work1.
Forbes and Rigobon (2001) divide theoretical explanations of contagion
into two groups: crisis-contingent and non-crisis-contingent theories. The
crisis-contingent theories assume that the transmission mechanisms change
during a crisis, and therefore market co-movements increase after a shock.
Examples of crisis-contingent theories are based on multiple equilibria and
endogenous liquidity. International investors could find it rational to sud-
denly withdraw their capital from a country if they fear to be otherwise left
with no claim on a limited pool of foreign exchange reserves. Formal models
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of contagion with multiple equilibria have been developed, among others,
by Masson (1999). An example of crisis-contingent theories in which the
transmission mechanism is based on liquidity shocks is due to Goldfajn and
Valdes (1997). According to these authors liquidity constraints can induce
agents to sell securities of emerging markets once they have incurred losses
due to currency and equity depreciations in the crisis country.
The non-crisis-contingent theories assume that any large cross-market
correlations after a shock are a continuation of linkages existing before the
crisis. Examples of these theories base their explanations of how shocks are
transmitted on “real linkages”, that is economic fundamentals, such as trade
and common global shocks. Glick and Rose (1999) claim that when a crisis
country experiences a currency devaluation, its major trading partners and
competitors are likely to suﬀer a speculative attack themselves. This occurs
because investors foresee that a depreciation of the first victim-country will
turn the trade balance of the partner countries into a deficit requiring a
devaluation to balance the trade account. On the other hand, simultaneous
crises across countries can occur because of a common, global shock, such as
a major shift in industrial countries production or a change in commodity
prices. Calvo and Reinhart (1996) and Chuhan et al. (1998) relate changes
in US interest rates to capital flows in Latin America.
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Following Forbes and Rigobon (2002, p. 2224), in this paper contagion
is defined as “a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock
to one country (or group of countries). According to this definition, if two
markets show a high degree of co-movement during periods of stability, even
if the markets continue to be highly correlated after a shock to one market,
this may not constitute contagion. According to this paper’s definition, it
is only contagion if cross-market co-movement increases significantly after
the shock”. This definition presents two advantages. First, it provides a
straightforward test to measure contagion, by measuring the cross-market
correlations before and after a shock. Second, tests based on this definition
can provide evidence in favour of or against each of the two groups of theories
discussed above.
Correlation analysis has been widely used in the empirical literature on
contagion. This approach considers a significant increase in correlation be-
tween markets as evidence of contagion. A seminal paper by King and Wad-
hwani (1990) uses this approach to look at changes in correlation coeﬃcients
between diﬀerent markets occurring after the stock market crash in October
1987. A wide number of papers have applied this approach to study the
most recent financial crises, finding evidence of large co-movements of asset
returns, although it is not clear whether such co-movements increase signif-
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icantly after a crisis. Baig and Goldfajn (1999) find a significant increase
in cross-country correlations among currencies and sovereign spreads of five
East Asian countries during the 1997-98 turmoil if compared to other tran-
quil periods. Bazdresch and Werner (2001) apply the correlation analysis,
along with other econometric techniques, to quantify the contagion suﬀered
by Mexico in the financial crises of the period 1997-1999. However, a sig-
nificant increase in correlations among diﬀerent countries’ markets may not
be suﬃcient evidence of contagion. In fact, Forbes and Rigobon (2002)
show that, owing to an increase in volatility of economic variables over cri-
sis periods, higher correlations could simply be due to heteroscedasticity,
and therefore be the result of historical high correlation between markets.
Hence, empirical tests tend to favour the hypothesis of excessive transmis-
sion if heteroscedasticity is not corrected for. More generally, correlation
coeﬃcients in specific sub samples tend to be biased in the presence of het-
eroscedasticity, endogeneity and omitted variables. A number of papers try
to solve this problem. Forbes and Rigobon (2002), for example, estimate
a model for three financial crises (Wall Street in 1987, Mexico in 1994-95,
Asia in 1997) using daily returns of the stock market and short term inter-
est rates, and show that when correlation coeﬃcients are adjusted for the
increased volatility, the hypothesis of contagion is rejected in most of the
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cases. Subsequently, they argue that the increase in correlation is simply a
result of interdependence rather than a change in linkages.
Far from being a memory of the past, new crises have opened the second
millennium. The first of these crises has been the Argentine one. After
nearly four years of recession, in December 2001 Argentina first froze savings
deposits as a measure to stop bank runs, and then defaulted on its 155 billion
dollars public debt. In January 2002, after a decade of fixed parity with the
dollar, the Argentine Peso was first devalued and then was let float.
Whatever the causes of the crisis, since the beginning some media have
been talking about contagion, spreading risk, and spillover eﬀects from Ar-
gentina to its neighbour countries, mainly Brazil, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
The goal of this paper is to test claims of contagion from Argentina to a
set of countries chosen either because they are strictly related through trade
and financial linkages, as are Brazil, Venezuela, and Uruguay, or because
they have been aﬀected in the past by contagion, such as Mexico and Russia,
or, finally, because they are simultaneously aﬀected by a similar crisis, as in
the case of Turkey.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the econometric
methodology; Section 3 presents and discusses the empirical results; Section
4 summarizes and concludes. Data sources and further tests are presented
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in the Appendix.
2 Empirical methodology
The empirical analysis is carried out without the assumption of a specific the-
oretical model explaining the causes and mechanism of contagion. I analyse
the relationship between the main financial markets of diﬀerent countries by
using two econometric methodologies. First, a Vector Autoregressive (VAR)
model is estimated for each of the financial markets to obtain an insight in
the causal relationships between the same variables for diﬀerent countries.
According to Bazdresch andWerner (2001, p. 303) “VARs provide for lagged
responses between variables, measuring the span of time that shocks take
to disappear and providing a first approximation to address issues of cau-
sation”. Second, instantaneous correlation coeﬃcients, which constitute an
intuitive measure of co-movements, are estimated and then tested using the
two sample heteroscedastic t-test developed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002).
The financial markets analysed, commonly considered as the main ve-
hicles of contagion, are the foreign exchange, the stock exchange, and the
sovereign debt market.
Brazil, Uruguay, and Venezuela are considered because they are Ar-
gentina’s main neighbours. I also consider Russia and Mexico because re-
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cently (1994 and 1998) they have been aﬀected by financial crises and conta-
gion. Finally, Turkey is included because it is experiencing a serious financial
crisis at the same time as Argentina.
The Appendix contains a detailed discussion of the variables and the
sources of data.
2.1 VAR model
In this paper, a VAR model is estimated for each financial market using
daily data ranging from December 1st, 2001 to November 29th, 20022. The
order of the model is chosen on the basis of the sequential log-likelihood ratio
test, which selects a model of order 3 for the foreign exchange and the stock
exchange markets, and a model of order 4 for the sovereign debt market.
Prior to running the estimation, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and
Phillips-Perron (PP) tests were carried out on the logarithms of the time
series in order to test for unit roots: all variables are I(1) at a 5% confidence
level, with both a constant and a linear trend. The results of the unit root
tests are reported in Tables 1, 2, and 3.3
[Insert Tables 1,2 and 3 about here]
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Formally, the VAR system in a standard or reduced form is given by:
yt = c+Φ1yt−1 +Φ2yt−2 + ...+Φpyt−p + εt (1)
where yt is an (n×1) vector of variables, c is an (n×1) vector of constants,
Φj is an (n× n) matrix of autoregressive coeﬃcients for j = 1, 2, ..., p, and
εt is a multivariate white noise process, i.e., εt ∼ i.i.d.N(0,Ω), with Ω an
(n× n) symmetric positive definite matrix.
In the three VAR models estimated, the vector yt includes the following
variables.
• For the exchange rates yt = {ARGpesot, BRArealt, MEXpesot, RUSroublet,
TURlirat, URUpesot, VENbolivart}0
• For the stock market indexes yt = {ARGgenert, BRAbovespat, MEXipct,
RUSrtst, VENgenert}0. Due to the insignificant level of capitalization
of the Uruguayan and the Turkish stock market, these two countries
are excluded from the model.
• For the sovereign debt spreads yt = {ARGt, BRAt, MEXt, RUSt,
TURt, VENt}0. Data on the Uruguayan sovereign spreads are not
available.
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2.2 Correlation coeﬃcients
The second technique is based on instantaneous correlation coeﬃcients,
which give an intuitive measure of the degree of co-movement between eco-
nomic variables. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) show that an increase in the
variance of a financial variable over a crisis period biases the estimation of
the correlation coeﬃcients in favour of the conclusion that the correlation
between variables is significantly higher in turmoil periods than in tran-
quil periods, and thus contagion exists. In order to eliminate this bias they
propose to correct the standard correlation coeﬃcient by using the formula:
ρ =
ρup
1 + δ[1− (ρu)2]
(2)
where ρu is the unadjusted (i.e., conditional on heteroscedasticity) correla-
tion coeﬃcient, δ is the relative increase in the variance of the crisis country’s
variable from the tranquil to the turmoil period, and ρ is the adjusted cor-
relation coeﬃcient. Once corrected in this fashion, the significance of the
increase of the correlation coeﬃcient during the crisis period as compared
to the tranquil period is tested using a one-tail t-test, assuming a t-student
asymptotic distribution. The hypotheses are:
H0 : ρc ≥ ρt (3)
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H1 : ρc < ρt (4)
where ρc represents the adjusted correlation coeﬃcient for the crisis period,
while ρt represents the correlation coeﬃcient for the tranquil period. The
tranquil period ranges from January 1st, 2001 to May 31st, 2001, which is a
good control period for all of the three financial markets. The crisis period
goes from December 1st, 2001 to November 29th, 2002.
3 Empirical results
In this Section, I use VAR models and correlation coeﬃcients corrected for
heteroscedasticity to analyse the contagion eﬀects of the Argentine financial
crisis. Based on the results of the unit root tests in Subsection 2.1, the
correlation analysis considers log-diﬀerences of the variables of interest to
avoid spurious regression issues. As for the VAR analysis, when the time
series are nonstationary, as in this case, the VAR model can be specified in
pure diﬀerences, in levels, or it can be specified as a Vector Error Correction
Model (VECM) to allow for the existence of cointegration. Following the
line of argument of Ramaswamy and Slok (1998), I do not use a VECM since
this paper is not focused on the long run relationship among the variables.
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To make the VAR analysis consistent with the correlation one, variables in
log-diﬀerences instead of log-levels are used. Appendix reports the results
obtained in the correlation analysis by using variables in log-levels rather
than in log-diﬀerences.
3.1 VAR analysis
Generalized impulse response functions and generalized forecast error vari-
ance decompositions provide adequate tools to assess the impact of one shock
on an Argentine financial market on the other countries4. The duration of
this eﬀect is also highlighted.
3.1.1 Foreign exchange markets
Table 4 shows to what extent the forecast error variance of the Argentine
exchange rate can explain the variance of other countries’ exchange rates.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
The contemporary eﬀect is negligible for all markets, and it remains
such for Brazil and Mexico up to 15 days. The eﬀect is somewhat bigger for
Turkey (1.78% after 10 days), Uruguay (2.2% after 10 days), and Venezuela
(1.86% after 10 days). Russia’s currency seems to be much more aﬀected
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by a shock to the Argentine’s Peso: 8.79 % after 5 days and 8.97% after 15
days.
As for the immediate impact, Figure 1 shows that a shock on the Argen-
tine currency has no significant eﬀect on any other currencies.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
In the next period, it aﬀects the Russian Rouble, the Turkish Lira, the
Uruguayan Peso, and the Venezuelan Bolivar, but these eﬀects die out after
just six days or so.
3.1.2 Stock markets
Table 5 reports the percentage eﬀect of the Argentina’s stock index variance
on the forecast error variance of the other countries’ stock indexes.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
The eﬀect on Brazil is almost null while it is very small on Mexico (1.74%
after 5 days), Russia (1.66% after 5 days and up to 15 days), and Venezuela
(1.66% after 5 days and up to 15 days).
The impulse response function shown in Figure 2 reveals a similar sce-
nario: a one standard deviation innovation in Argentina’s stock index does
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not produce any statistically significant eﬀect on Russia, Mexico, Brazil, and
Venezuela.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
To sum up, stock markets in the countries under analysis show an in-
significant reaction to the crisis in Argentina.
3.1.3 Sovereign debt markets
Sovereign debt spreads seem slightly more reactive to the Argentine crisis,
though there is still no statistically significant eﬀect. Only the forecast
error variance of Brazil and Venezuela is determined by more than 3% by
the Argentine spreads from 0 to 15 days ahead forecast.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Figure 3 shows that, though in the right direction, a one standard de-
viation innovation in Argentine spreads has a small and short lasting eﬀect
on the other countries’ spreads.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
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3.2 Correlation analysis
Correlation analysis gives a straightforward measure of variables’ co-movement.
In order to have a complete picture of the timing of the crisis in Argentina
and of its potential eﬀects on other countries, I analyse four time-intervals.
These four time-intervals all start when the crisis begins: the first two weeks,
the first two months, the first four months and the all-crisis interval until the
end of the sample (November 29th, 2002). I expect to find evidence of an
increasing correlation between markets immediately after the crisis began,
and a diminishing correlation in later weeks.
3.2.1 Foreign exchange markets
Looking at table 7, it is clear that exchange rate correlations do not exhibit
any degree of contagion.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Correlation coeﬃcients decrease in the crisis period for Brazil (after the
first two weeks) and Uruguay, while for the rest of the countries the increase
of the coeﬃcients is negligible. However, this analysis is somewhat question-
able, since the Argentine Peso exchange rate versus the US Dollar was fixed
until January 4th, 2002, i.e. for all the tranquil period and part of the crisis
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period. Note that the Uruguayan exchange rate too, was fixed until June
2002.
3.2.2 Stock markets
Stock market correlations, shown in Table 8, exhibit a sharp decrease in
the correlation coeﬃcients for Brazil, Mexico, Russia, and Venezuela in all
periods: they drop close to zero immediately after the crisis begins, and
remain at this level up to the end of the sample period.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
Therefore, no stock markets in the set of countries analysed seem to have
suﬀered contagion from Argentina. The correlation between the Turkish and
the Uruguayan stock markets and the Argentine one is not available due to
the scarce capitalization of the first two, hence the blank columns in Table
8.
3.2.3 Sovereign debt markets
In the sovereign debt markets, as well as in the stock markets, the correlation
coeﬃcients decrease sharply. The sovereign debt market does not show any
evidence of contagion.
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[Insert Table 9 about here]
4 Conclusion
This paper tests the hypothesis of contagion for the latest Argentine financial
crisis which began in December 2001. The set of countries is chosen either
because they belong to the same region (Brazil, Uruguay, and Venezuela),
or because they have recently been aﬀected by contagion (Russia and Mex-
ico), or because they are experiencing a severe financial crisis at the same
time as Argentina (Turkey). Three diﬀerent financial markets are consid-
ered: foreign exchange, stock exchange, sovereign debt. The hypothesis of
contagion is tested by using Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models, and cor-
relation coeﬃcients corrected to solve for heteroscedasticity, as suggested by
Forbes and Rigobon (2002). Although rather small eﬀects between the vari-
ables emerge in the VAR analysis, contagion is definitely excluded by the
estimation of the correlation coeﬃcients. In the foreign exchange market
these correlation coeﬃcients appear to be smaller during the crisis periods,
if compared to the tranquil period, for Brazil and Uruguay. The coeﬃcients
increase slightly for the rest of the countries. The stock exchange mar-
ket exhibits a sharp decrease in the correlation coeﬃcients during the crisis
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period for all the countries in the sample. As for the sovereign debt, the
VAR model shows a small but noticeable reaction of the Brazilian, Mexican,
Russian, and Venezuelan spreads to the Argentine turmoil. The analysis of
the correlation coeﬃcients, however, shows no evidence of contagion.
All this seems to suggest that investors perceived the Argentine crisis as
an isolated case, which probably arose as a consequence of the mismanage-
ment of the public finance. Other Latin American countries (Brazil, Mexico,
Uruguay, and Venezuela), characterized by sounder fundamentals, seem to
have been immune to the Argentine turmoil.
The evidence provided in this paper can be seen as supportive of the
group of non-crisis-contingent theories, that is, of the theories which tend
to base explanations of contagion on “real linkages” among countries.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Data
Exchange rates: ARGpeso, BRAreal, MEXpeso, RUSrouble, TURlira, URU-
peso, and VENbolivar indicate the daily exchange rate vis-a-vis the US
Dollar for Argentine Peso, Brazilian Real, Mexican Peso, Russian Rouble,
Turkish Lira, Uruguayan Peso, and Venezuelan Bolivar. The source is Datas-
tream Advance 3.5.
Stock market indexes: ARGgener, BRAbovespa, MEXipc, RUSrts, and
VENgener indicate the daily stock leading index for Argentina, Brazil, Mex-
ico, Russia, and Venezuela. Again, the source is Datastream Advance 3.5.
Sovereign debt spreads: ARG, BRA, MEX, RUS, TUR, and VEN indi-
cate the daily Emerging Markets Bonds Index + (EMBI+) provided by the
investment bank J. P. Morgan. The EMBI+ is a composite index of the
external-currency-denominated debt instruments of the emerging markets.
It tracks the spreads between yields of the sovereign debt of the emerging
markets and that of the corresponding US Treasury bonds, thus giving a
benchmark measure of risk premium and, therefore, of country risk as per-
ceived by investors.
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5.2 Alternative tests on level variables
Tables 10, 11, and 12 report the results of the correlation analysis on the
log-levels rather than the log-diﬀerenced variables. As shown in Subsection
2.1, all the time series in log-levels are I(1). This supports the procedure of
using log-diﬀerences as a way of avoiding the issue of spurious regression.
Nevertheless, looking at the variables in log-levels is interesting as it shows
that the correlation analysis is not robust to the way we transform variables.
In fact, though contagion seems to be absent in the estimation of the cor-
relation coeﬃcients of the exchange rates, Table 115 shows that the stock
exchange market exhibits a significant degree of contagion from Argentina
to Mexico in the first two weeks of the crisis period, and to Russia in the
first two months. No significant eﬀect can be observed, however, on the
other countries’ stock indexes.
[Insert Tables 10 and 11 about here]
As for the sovereign spreads, the analysis of the coeﬃcients reported in
Table 12 makes clear that for Mexico, Turkey, and Venezuela it is legitimate
to talk about contagion. Correlation coeﬃcients for these three countries,
in fact, increase in a significant way over the whole crisis period. Contagion
emerges also in the first two months for Venezuela.
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[Insert Table 12 about here]
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Notes
1See Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) for a critical review of theoretical and
empirical studies.
2Although fixing a starting date for a financial crisis is somewhat arbi-
trary, in this study I consider December 1st, 2001, when savings accounts
were frozen, the starting point of the Argentine crisis. Since, at the time
this paper is written, the crisis is still going on, I choose a sample period of
one year ending on November 29th 2002.
3Lag lenghts for the ADF test are in square braquets. * indicates rejec-
tion of the null hypothesis of unit root at 5% level. The Turkish and the
Uruguayan Stock Market Indexes are not considered due to the negligible
level of capitalization. Data on the Uruguayan Sovereign Spreads are not
available.
4Unlike the orthogonalized impulse response function and the orthog-
onalized forecast error variance decomposition, the generalized procedure
is not dependent on the ordering of the variables in the VAR. For further
details see Pesaran and Pesaran (1997).
5I report any 1 percent (∗∗∗), 5 percent (∗∗) or 10 percent (∗) statistically
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significant increase of the correlation coeﬃcients in the crisis period from the
tranquil period.
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COUNTRY ADF PP Order of Integration
lnER 4lnER lnER 4lnER
Argentina -1.67[1] -19.20[0]* -1.62 -19.09* I(1)
Brazil -1.22[2] -19.78[1]* -1.44 -19.85* I(1)
Mexico -1.75[0] -23.26[0]* -1.64 -23.31* I(1)
Russia -1.63[2] -21.54[1]* -1.72 -27.20* I(1)
Turkey -2.47[2] -18.73[1]* -2.33 -19.75* I(1)
Uruguay -1.49[0] -22.64[0]* -1.45 -22.70* I(1)
Venezuela -2.24[8] -18.90[1]* -1.89 -25.79* I(1)
Table 1: Unit root tests for the Exchange Rates.
COUNTRY ADF PP Order of Integration
lnSI 4lnSI lnSI 4lnSI
Argentina -2.00[0] -20.88[0]* -2.02 -20.83* I(1)
Brazil -1.91[1] -19.46[0]* -1.77 -19.38* I(1)
Mexico -1.85[0] -20.63[0]* -1.93 -20.60* I(1)
Russia -1.88[0] -21.65[0]* -1.94 -21.65* I(1)
Turkey - - - - -
Uruguay - - - - -
Venezuela -2.98[0] -18.34[1]* -2.93 -23.89* I(1)
Table 2: Unit root tests for the Stock Indexes.
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COUNTRY ADF PP Order of Integration
lnSS 4lnSS lnSS 4lnSS
Argentina -1.17[0] -19.43[0]* -1.17 -19.44* I(1)
Brazil -1.70[2] -13.92[1]* -1.90 -16.48* I(1)
Mexico -1.93[0] -15.62[1]* -1.92 -20.91* I(1)
Russia -1.40[0] -14.44[1]* -1.51 -18.46* I(1)
Turkey -1.84[1] -13.75[1]* -1.62 -20.87* I(1)
Uruguay - - - - -
Venezuela -2.73[0] -22.98[0]* -2.52 -23.40* I(1)
Table 3: Unit root tests for the Sovereign Spreads.
Day Brazil Mexico Russia Turkey Uruguay Venezuela
0 0.8E-3 0.0013 0.0026 0.9E-4 0.0040 0.7E-4
5 0.0012 0.0055 0.0879 0.0156 0.0191 0.0182
10 0.0013 0.0085 0.0897 0.0178 0.0220 0.0186
15 0.0013 0.0086 0.0897 0.0179 0.0221 0.0187
Table 4: Exchange Rate generalized forecast error variance decomposition:
percentage of forecast error variance explained by the Argentine Peso.
Day Brazil Mexico Russia Turkey Uruguay Venezuela
0 0.0031 0.0118 0.0164 - - 0.0028
5 0.0032 0.0174 0.0166 - - 0.0166
10 0.0032 0.0179 0.0166 - - 0.0166
15 0.0032 0.0179 0.0166 - - 0.0166
Table 5: Stock Index generalized forecast error variance decomposition: per-
centage of forecast error variance explained by the Argentina’s General.
Days Brazil Mexico Russia Turkey Uruguay Venezuela
0 0.0368 0.0096 0.0192 0.2E-3 - 0.0275
5 0.0375 0.0138 0.0253 0.0173 - 0.0360
10 0.0375 0.0140 0.0253 0.0176 - 0.0363
15 0.0375 0.0140 0.0253 0.0176 - 0.0363
Table 6: Sovereign Debt Spread generalized forecast error variance decom-
position: percentage of forecast error variance explained by the Argentine
Spreads.
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Brazil Mexico Russia Turkey Uruguay Venezuela
Tranquil Period 0.0302 -0.0077 -0.0480 -0.0630 0.0399 -0.0434
Crisis period
First two weeks 0.0375 0.0645 0.0018 -0.0071 0.0168 0.0017
First two months 0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0011 0.0009 -0.0006
First four months 0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0005 2.4E-05 -0.0005
First year 0.0004 -0.0005 2.2E-05 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0004
Table 7: Exchange Rates correlation coeﬃcients with Argentine Peso for
diﬀerent periods.
Brazil Mexico Russia Turkey Uruguay Venezuela
Tranquil Period 0.7212 0.4798 0.2676 - - 0.1792
Crisis period
First two weeks -0.0288 0.0534 -0.0149 - - -0.1094
First two months 0.0225 0.0087 0.0419 - - -0.0030
First four months 0.0247 0.0149 0.0479 - - -0.0295
First year 0.0116 0.0264 0.0522 - - -0.0174
Table 8: Stock Indexes correlation coeﬃcients with Argentine General Stock
Index for diﬀerent periods.
Brazil Mexico Russia Turkey Uruguay Venezuela
Tranquil Period 0.8544 0.5415 0.5686 0.3513 - 0.6674
Crisis period
First two weeks 0.1832 0.0809 0.0469 -0.0618 - 0.1632
First two months 0.2757 -0.0009 0.0897 -0.0072 - 0.1667
First four months 0.2686 6.E-05 0.0883 -0.0211 - 0.1015
First year 0.1852 0.1099 0.1305 -0.0093 - 0.1274
Table 9: Sovereign Debt Spreads correlation coeﬃcients with Argentine
Spreads for diﬀerent periods.
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Brazil Mexico Russia Turkey Uruguay Venezuela
Tranquil Period -0.0675 0.1042 -0.0141 -0.0918 -0.0559 -0.0766
Crisis period
First two weeks -0.0611 -0.0279 0.0354 -0.0641 0.0526 0.0819
First two months 0.0006 0.0001 0.0021 -0.0031 0.0003 0.0014
First four months 0.0002 -0.0006 0.0027 -0.0013 0.0010 0.0008
First year 0.0006 0.0008 0.0025 0.0005 0.0008 0.0010
Table 10: Exchange Rates correlation coeﬃcients with Argentine Peso for
diﬀerent periods.
Brazil Mexico Russia Turkey Uruguay Venezuela
Tranquil Period 0.850 0.020 -0.343 - - 0.620
Crisis period
First two weeks 0.393 0.826*** 0.130 - - 0.079
First two months 0.244 0.006 -0.103* - - 0.217
First four months -0.022 -0.261 -0.320 - - 0.243
First year 0.140 0.073 -0.281 - - 0.210
Table 11: Stock Indexes correlation coeﬃcients with Argentine General
Stock Index for diﬀerent periods.
Brazil Mexico Russia Turkey Uruguay Venezuela
Tranquil Period 0.963 -0.340 -0.192 0.543 - -0.131
Crisis period
First two weeks -0.865 -0.845 -0.898 -0.905 - 0.186
First two months 0.163 -0.368 -0.250 -0.458 - 0.726***
First four months -0.626 -0.622 -0.583 -0.766 - -0.361
First year 0.845 0.585*** -0.249 0.693*** - 0.172***
Table 12: Sovereign Debt Spreads correlation coeﬃcients with Argentine
Spreads for diﬀerent periods.
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Figure 1: Response of each country’s Exchange Rate to a generalized one
standard deviation innovation in Argentina’s Exchange Rate.
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Figure 2: Response of each country’s leading Stock Market to a generalized
one standard deviation innovation in Argentina’s Stock Market.
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Figure 3: Response of each country’s Sovereign Spreads to a generalized one
standard deviation innovation in Argentina’s Sovereign Spread.
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